

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 119-33
OFFERED BY MR. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA

At the end of subtitle F of title XII, add the following new section:

1 **SEC. 12 ____. MODIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON MILI-**
2 **TARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN-**
3 **VOLVING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

4 (a) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Subsection (b) of
5 section 1234 of the National Defense Authorization Act
6 for Fiscal Year 2021 (134 Stat. 3936) is amended—

7 (1) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the
8 following:

9 “(2) An assessment of developments in the mili-
10 tary doctrine, force structure, training, operational
11 concepts, joint command and organizational struc-
12 tures, and significant military operations and deploy-
13 ments of the Russian Armed Forces, including Rus-
14 sian adaptation based on its operations in
15 Ukraine.”;

16 (2) in paragraph (5)—

17 (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (B)
18 and (C) as subparagraphs (C) and (D), respec-
19 tively; and

1 (B) by inserting after subparagraph (A)
2 the following:

3 “(B) Russia’s military cooperation with
4 and presence in Belarus, including transfers or
5 deployments of Russian nuclear-capable weapon
6 systems to Belarus;”;

7 (3) by striking paragraph (9) and inserting the
8 following:

9 “(9) An assessment of the impact of United
10 States and international sanctions on the Russian
11 military’s reconstitution efforts, including analyses
12 of the following elements:

13 “(A) An assessment of the impact of re-
14 moving sanctions on the Russian military’s re-
15 constitution efforts.

16 “(B) A description of Russian circumven-
17 tion of Western sanctions and export controls
18 targeting the Russian military industrial base,
19 including the role of the People’s Republic of
20 China and other adversarial state and non-state
21 actors.”;

22 (4) in paragraph (10), by striking the period at
23 the end and inserting “and shared them with the
24 People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of

1 Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of
2 Korea.”;

3 (5) in paragraph (12), by striking the period at
4 the end and inserting “, including how Russia is
5 helping to increase the military capability, capacity,
6 and readiness of the People’s Liberation Army.”;

7 (6) by striking paragraph (13) and inserting
8 the following:

9 “(13) An assessment of the military cooperation
10 between Russia and the People’s Republic of China,
11 including weapons development, defense trade, com-
12 bined military exercises, and the sharing of intel-
13 ligence, and how that cooperation impacts the
14 United States, its interests, and its allies and part-
15 ners.”;

16 (7) in paragraph (17), by striking the period at
17 the end and inserting “, including Russia’s security
18 cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran and
19 terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the
20 Houthis.”;

21 (8) by striking paragraph (21) and inserting
22 the following:

23 “(21) An assessment of the character, extent,
24 trajectory, and consequence of Russia’s security co-
25 operation with Iran, the People’s Republic of China,

1 and North Korea, including Russia’s provision of in-
2 telligence, drones, or other military-related support
3 to Iran after 2022.”;

4 (9) in paragraph (22), by striking “mass de-
5 struction or missile systems” and inserting “mass
6 destruction, missile systems, one-way attack un-
7 manned aerial systems, and other significant weap-
8 ons systems,”;

9 (10) by redesignating paragraphs (30), (31),
10 and (32) as paragraphs (32), (33), and (34), respec-
11 tively; and

12 (11) by inserting after paragraph (29) the fol-
13 lowing:

14 “(30) An assessment of Russia’s hybrid warfare
15 strategy and capabilities, including—

16 “(A) Russia’s information warfare strategy
17 and capabilities, including the use of misin-
18 formation, disinformation, and propaganda in
19 social and traditional media;

20 “(B) Russia’s financing of political parties,
21 think tanks, media organizations, and academic
22 institutions;

23 “(C) Russia’s malicious cyber activities;

1 “(D) Russia’s use of coercive economic
2 tools, including sanctions, market access, and
3 differential pricing, especially in energy exports;

4 “(E) Russia’s use of criminal networks and
5 corruption to achieve political objectives;

6 “(F) Russian sabotage and other ‘active
7 measures’ in Western countries; and

8 “(G) Russian intelligence gathering and re-
9 cruitment of assets, including journalists and
10 media personalities.

11 “(31) An assessment of the involvement of the
12 armed forces of the Russian Federation, the intel-
13 ligence and security services of the Russian Federa-
14 tion (including the Federal Security Service, the
15 Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Main Direc-
16 torate of the General Staff), and any proxy force, ir-
17 regular force, or private military or security com-
18 pany acting on behalf of, with the support of, or in
19 coordination with the Government of the Russian
20 Federation, in the production, transportation, dis-
21 tribution, financing, or facilitation of trafficking in
22 narcotics and other controlled substances.”.

